London, November 2025: — In the sprawling network of Barnet, Enfield & Haringey (BEH) Mental Health NHS Trust, the Care Quality Commission (CQC) has repeatedly raised the alarm over poor record-keeping. These failures, documented over years of inspection, have involved serious risk-assessment lapses, muddled governance, and inconsistent communication between staff and patients. This is not a story of isolated incidents — but a systemic deficiency that has recurred over successive inspections.
A Troubling Legacy at Silver Birches
One of the starkest examples comes from Silver Birches, a ward for older patients with mental health conditions (including dementia), located in Enfield. In a 2023 CQC inspection report, inspectors noted that safety “huddles” — daily or frequent multidisciplinary meetings intended to flag risk and communicate key concerns — were “infrequent and poorly recorded.” CQC API+1
Even more worrying: risk-incident records, which should capture not only what happened, but why and how to prevent recurrence, “were poorly written,” giving “insufficient details about why a risk incident occurred and how it could be prevented.” CQC API Because of this, staff lacked up-to-date understanding of patient risk, which could (and did) lead to safety concerns being overlooked.
The report also found governance gaps: “Managers did not follow up actions agreed at governance meetings … Some records of these meetings were badly written … There was no data on incidents presented … meaning there was no systematic way … to identify any themes or trends.” CQC API This absence of reliable documentation prevents the trust from learning from its own mistakes.
Risk Assessment Records: Sketches, Not Stories
Beyond Silver Birches, inspectors also raised concerns about how risk assessments were maintained more broadly across BEH services. On one ward, the report described that “changes in risk were recorded … but risk assessments were not always kept up to date, making it more difficult to access the most up-to-date risk information.” Care Quality Commission
In other words: when a patient’s risk profile shifted — perhaps after a crisis or incident — the formal assessment document did not reliably reflect that change. People overseeing the patient’s care could be working from stale records.
When Meetings Don’t Meet
Part of the problem, CQC says, lies in how meetings are (or are not) documented. On Silver Birches, those “safety huddles” were not only rare but the written notes of them lacked substance. CQC API Without solid meeting minutes, there may be no reliable record of what was discussed, what follow-up actions were agreed, or what risk mitigation was put in place.
Moreover, following serious incidents (falls, safeguarding concerns, even patient deaths), the exposure of poor documentation is especially stark. The CQC report found that six incidents involving either safeguarding or falls — some resulting in serious injury — “had not been discussed with staff” in governance meetings. CQC API That means lessons weren’t necessarily captured, shared or acted on.
Communication Failures That Affect Care
Beyond written risk records, the CQC also flagged poor sharing of information. In several cases, it identified that staff “were not always aware of incidents that had happened on the ward.” CQC API If staff who interact with patients do not know about past safety incidents — particularly on a ward where patients may be vulnerable — that creates a fragile foundation for patient safety.
Inspectors also found that the action plans agreed after incident reviews were basic; some “did not involve significant change,” meaning even when poor record-keeping was identified, the response was limited. CQC API
Legacy of Poor Documentation
These are not cosmetic issues: record-keeping lapses have real consequences. The CQC observed that on Silver Birches, risk assessments and progress notes for a patient who fell and fractured an arm were “brief … did not provide details … of why the incident occurred or how to prevent further incidents.” CQC API In a high-risk environment, that is deeply concerning.
By not fully documenting incidents or learning from them, the trust potentially misses out on preventing future harm. When minutes, risk assessment forms, or handover notes do not accurately capture a patient’s changing condition, staff may be flying blind.
A Culture of Poor Follow-up
It’s not just that records are badly kept; the CQC also highlights that promised improvements weren’t always followed through. On Silver Birches, managers had agreed action plans to improve safety and care, but “no follow-up to any of the actions agreed at clinical governance meetings … meant managers had no way of knowing whether the agreed actions had been implemented.” CQC API In practice, that means calls to improve procedures become words on paper, not real change.
Has Anything Improved?
Interestingly, not all record-keeping is condemned. In a 2022 CQC report covering some BEH services, inspectors found that patient notes were comprehensive, and staff ensured both paper and electronic systems were “up-to-date and complete.” beh-mht.nhs.uk But that positive finding does not apply uniformly — the 2023 inspection of older people’s wards (Silver Birches) underlines that problems remain.
But What About Named Cases?
One independent investigation titled “Mr EF” (published in 2017) looked in detail at the care of a service user within BEH. NHS England While the report is thorough, it does not focus heavily on general poor record-keeping but more on decisions around risk, discharge, and care planning. It raises dozens of concerns, but the primary narrative is around treatment decisions rather than documentation quality (though documentation plays into that).
Why Does This Matter?
In mental health care, accurate and timely records are non-negotiable. Clinicians rely on risk assessments, progress notes, handover documents, and incident reviews to build a coherent picture of a person’s mental state, their risk factors, and how to treat them safely. Failures in these systems put service users at risk:
- Staff may not have the most current information when making decisions.
- Learning from incidents may be lost if documentation is weak and follow-up is weak.
- Risk escalation might be missed if assessments are stale.
- Organizational learning suffers if governance systems don’t track or act on themes.
Conclusion: A Trust Still Wrestling With Its Paper Trail
BEH Mental Health NHS Trust is, by its own CQC rating, overall “Good”. Care Quality Commission But when you dig into the quality of its record-keeping — particularly on older people’s wards like Silver Birches — a more complicated and disturbing picture emerges. The trust’s problems are not limited to under-staffing or caseloads; they include how risk and incident data are documented, shared, and acted upon.
The repeated CQC findings suggest that BEH knows about these issues, but there is a gap between acknowledging them and embedding systemic change. As the regulator said, the trust “must make improvements” — but without consistent, rigorous documentation and follow-through, those improvements risk vanishing into poorly kept meeting notes.
For service users, their families, and the staff who truly want to learn from mistakes, the cost of weak record-keeping could be very high.
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Findings (chronological by report)
1) Wards for older people with mental health problems — BEH
Published: 11 Oct 2023 (Silver Birches & other older-people wards) — inspection report (PDF, 25 pages).
- Finding (governance / meeting records): managers did not follow up actions agreed at governance meetings; “Records of some governance meetings were poorly written.” — Page P1. CQC API
Short quote: “Records of some governance meetings were poorly written.” — P1. CQC API - Finding (safety huddles & risk incident notes): safety huddles were infrequent and poorly recorded; “records of risk incidents were poorly written, giving insufficient details…” — Page P1. CQC API
Short quote: “records of risk incidents were poorly written, giving insufficient details…” — P1. CQC API - Finding (learning from incidents / staff awareness): learning was not always shared; some staff “were not aware of incidents that had happened on the ward” (six incidents hadn’t been discussed with staff) — Page P1. CQC API
Short quote: “some staff were not aware of incidents that had happened on the ward.” — P1. CQC API
2) Trust inspection — Barnet, Enfield & Haringey Mental Health NHS Trust (Trust-level)
Published: 28 Feb 2022 — Trust inspection report (PDF, 100 pages).
- Finding (IT / data & information access): the trust was improving IT but inspectors noted staff still needed better access to live data; the report describes the trust’s work to “improve its IT infrastructure and the information available to staff.” — Page P3 (context: shows data access limitations affecting information flows). CQC API
Short quote: “the trust was in the process of improving its IT infrastructure and the information available to staff.” — P3. CQC API - Finding (governance / sharing learning): while the trust had introduced safety huddles, the trust still needed to embed some data and governance processes so staff could identify themes and act on them (see service-level detailed findings across the report). — multiple pages (see service sections below). CQC API
Note: the 2022 trust report is broad and many of the communication/records criticisms appear in the servicesubsections (below I list those specific service instances and page numbers).
3) Mental health crisis services and health-based places of safety — BEH
Published: 12 Jan 2018 (inspection of crisis teams, home treatment) — Core service report (PDF, 35 pages).
- Finding (risk assessments / record updates): home treatment teams did not always complete and update a full multidisciplinary risk assessment; they “did not always update records during planning meetings” and staff sometimes did not “know patient risks prior to supporting them.” — Page P4 (summary; detailed in findings). CQC API
Short quote: “did not always update records during planning meetings.” — P4. CQC API - Finding (responsiveness / communication to patients): the report said patients’ phone calls and appointment communications needed improvement (delays and unclear appointment info), i.e., communication with service users by the crisis/home treatment service was criticised. — Page P10. CQC API
4) Community-based mental health services for adults of working age — BEH
Published: 12 Jan 2018 (community services report, PDF 38 pages).
- Finding (S117 aftercare / recording entitlement): inspectors said the trust should ensure that where patients are entitled to Section 117 aftercare that this is recorded clearly in clinical notes — explicit instruction to improve record-keeping for aftercare entitlements. — Page P14. CQC API
Short quote: “ensure that … support under s117 … is recorded clearly in their clinical notes.” — P14. CQC API - Finding (record completeness): the report notes both positive and negative examples — some records were “complete, up to date and accurate” for CTO patients (page P16) but the requirement notice history shows trust-wide concerns about documentation completeness. — Page P16. CQC API
5) Specialist services / Eating disorder ward — BEH
Published: 04 May 2017 (focussed inspection) — Specialist eating disorders report (PDF, 16 pages).
- Finding (risk assessments & care plans): inspectors found staff had not completed comprehensive risk assessments for some patients or updated them after incidents; some patients had no care plans or incomplete care plans. This is an explicit record-keeping failure in patient files. — Page P3. CQC API
Short quote: “staff had not completed comprehensive risk assessments for some patients or updated them following some incidents.” — P3. CQC API
6) Wards / Acute wards & other core-service reports (2015–2017 series)
Published: various 2015–2018 core service reports (acute wards, older-people, liaison, CAMHS). Key examples below:
- Dec 2015 / Mar 2016 / Jan 2018 inspections contain repeated criticisms that records and care plans were not always completed in sufficient detail (for example, diabetes care plans, hydration forms, and supervision notes) — see Wards for older people (2016/2018) and community sections. Example: “staff did not always develop care plans with sufficient detail” (older people ward report). — Page references vary by report (see the 2016/2018 PDFs listed on the CQC provider page). Care Quality Commission+1
Short quote (2017 older-people summary): “Staff did not always develop care plans with sufficient detail.” — see page in the 2016/2018 older-people PDF. Care Quality Commission
Quick synthesis — what the CQC reports show about record-keeping and communication across BEH (2015–2023)
- Repeated themes across years: inspectors repeatedly flagged incomplete or out-of-date risk assessments, care plans missing critical details, poor documentation of Section 117 aftercare entitlement, and inconsistent recording of medicines administration or medicine records. These appear in multiple core-service reports (crisis/home-treatment, community services, specialist wards). CQC API+2CQC API+2
- Poor meeting/incident records and learning not shared: Silver Birches (Oct 2023) is the clearest recent example where governance meeting records were “poorly written”, safety huddles were infrequent/poorly recorded, and incident-learning was not reliably cascaded to staff. CQC API
- Communication with users and between teams: CQC criticised crisis/home-treatment teams for not updating records during planning meetings (meaning staff might not know up-to-date risks) and for poor communication about appointments/phone responses. CQC API
Sources / primary CQC PDFs I used (downloaded from the CQC provider page)
- Wards for older people with mental health problems — Inspection report (11 Oct 2023). PDF. CQC API
- Barnet, Enfield & Haringey Trust — Trust inspection report (28 Feb 2022). PDF (trust-level). CQC API
- Mental health crisis services & health-based places of safety — BEH (12 Jan 2018). PDF. CQC API
- Community-based mental health services for adults of working age — BEH (12 Jan 2018). PDF. CQC API
- Specialist eating disorders services — BEH (04 May 2017). PDF. CQC API
- (Additional older CQC core reports 2015–2017 and service PDFs available on CQC provider page; I checked those for similar criticisms). Care Quality Commission
If you want any of the following next, I can deliver it right now (no waiting):
- A CSV with one row per criticism match (report title, publication date, exact excerpt, page number, PDF link).
- A single PDF briefing that reproduces each finding with the exact PDF page image (screenshot) next to the quoted text.
- A full list of every PDF on the CQC provider page with the page ranges where “record”, “records”, “record-keeping”, “care plan”, “risk assessment”, “huddle”, “meeting”, “communication” or “S117” appear (so you can audit everything).
Say which one you want and I’ll produce it in this reply. If you’d like me to dig still deeper and extract every line in each PDF that contains the words “record”, “risk assessment”, “care plan”, “communication”, “huddle”, “S117” or “handover”, say “do full text extract” and I’ll compile that into a CSV now.
Key documented references to poor handover / poor recording of S.117 aftercare
- CQC — Community-based mental health services for adults of working age (BEH) — inspection report (12 Jan 2018)
- What it says: the CQC explicitly recommended the trust “should ensure that where patients are entitled to support under s117 of the Mental Health Act that this is recorded clearly in their clinical notes.” In other words: entitlement to S.117 aftercare was not reliably recorded in patient records — a direct record-keeping failure that can (and does) undermine safe handover of responsibilities.
- Why it matters: if a patient’s S.117 status isn’t clearly documented, teams receiving or handing over care may not know whether statutory aftercare duties apply, who must provide services, or what funding/responsibility arrangements should be in place. That is a common root cause of handover disputes and missed care.
- Source / citation: CQC BEH community services report (2018). CQC API
- Local Government & Social Care Ombudsman (LGO) — Decision ordering clear CPA care-plan setting out S.117 aftercare (case decision reference 20 000 380a / “Miss X”)
- What it says: the Ombudsman required that the Council, Trust and ICB must ensure the service-user “has a CPA care plan that clearly sets out her Section 117 aftercare” and that any delays or refusals are documented. The LGO decision describes evidence of confusion, delays and failures to record or communicate S.117 arrangements — i.e., poor handover/communication of aftercare entitlements.
- Why it matters: an Ombudsman remedy that mandates a clearly documented CPA/S.117 plan shows an official finding that record-keeping and communication about S.117 were inadequate and caused the complainant distress.
- Source / citation: LGO decision (case 20 000 380a / Miss X). LGO+1
- CQC – Trust-level inspection report (Barnet, Enfield & Haringey) — summary / 28 Feb 2022 (and related 2022 PDFs)
- What it says: the 2022 trust inspection materials note that “Patients on section 117 leave were identified during daily planning meetings and on their patient care records” but also record that some staff did not always record clearly (application of MCA example) — indicating the trust had to rely on daily meetings to identify S.117 patients because records were not consistently authoritative. The implication: handover relied on spoken processes rather than consistently reliable written records.
- Why it matters: reliance on ephemeral meeting memory instead of unambiguous clinical-record flags increases the risk that responsibility for S.117 aftercare will be missed at transfer/handover.
- Source / citation: CQC trust inspection (2022). Mental Health Trust+1
- NHS independent / investigation material (Mazars independent review & related serious-incident work referencing S.117 meetings) — example report (Mazars, 2021/2019 materials)
- What it says: independent investigation material into serious incidents concerning BEH (Mazars and other reviews) documents that formal S.117 meetings were held and the need for proper S.117 handover / end-of-treatment reporting; the review also highlights weaknesses in how multi-agency S.117 planning and handover were recorded and executed in some cases.
- Why it matters: independent investigations after serious incidents repeatedly surface deficiencies in the multi-agency handover processes required under S.117 (for example, inadequate discharge/S.117 meetings, missing end-of-treatment reports).
- Source / citation: Mazars / independent investigation papers referencing Mr G and S.117 meetings. NHS England
- CQC major thematic / advice reports (‘Leaving hospital’ and related guidance) — CQC commentary (2022)
- What it says: CQC’s thematic work on discharge and leaving hospital emphasises that S.117 aftercare duties are often the subject of “complicated and long-running disputes” about responsibility; it notes inspectors have previously raised concerns about the quality of aftercare planning and the record/communication failures that cause disputes. In short, poor recording/handovers of S.117 arrangements are a recognised nationwide regulator problem, not just local to BEH — but BEH inspection reports show the same problems in practice.
- Why it matters: national-level regulator guidance confirms that ambiguity in who is responsible and poor recording are common mechanisms that produce poor handovers under S.117.
- Source / citation: CQC ‘Leaving hospital’ major report (May 2022). Care Quality Commission
- Yes — the public inspection and oversight record contains explicit references tying poor recording and handoverto Section 117 aftercare in BEH / Enfield-relevant materials. The clearest, most direct line is the CQC 2018 community services inspection which said the trust must ensure S.117 entitlements are “recorded clearly in their clinical notes” (i.e., they were not). The LGO decision (Miss X) also documents confusion/delays and orders clearly-documented CPA/S.117 plans. Together these show both record-keeping and handover/communication failures around S.117 in this system. CQC API+1
NHS independent / BEH investigation material (Mazars independent review & related serious-incident work referencing S.117 meetings) (Mazars, 2021/2019 materials)
Recommendations
Recommendation 1: The Trust should assure itself that it has the appropriate mechanisms in
place to formally monitor the ongoing application of CTOs and document any decisions and
MDT involvement pertaining to changes in their management (e.g. removal).
Recommendation 2: The Trust should develop a forum in which different community teams
are able to meet, share experiences and best practice.
Recommendation 3: The Trust Medical Director should ensure the revised risk assessment
template draws on existing good practice in place at other mental health trustsand is
available to staff within the next three months.
Recommendation 4: Side effect monitoring should be regularly undertaken and assessed as
part of the care plan in place.
Recommendation 5: The Trust should review its communication processes between
Inpatient and Community teams with a view to ensuring care coordinators are told in a timelymanner of patients’ discharge from the ward.
Recommendation 6: The Trust should evaluate the role of GP link workers with a view to
ensuring community staff and GP surgeries are confident the role is achieving its remit and
facilitating stronger relations between both groups.
Recommendation 7: The Trust must update its Discharge/Transfer policy and procedure
within three months.
Recommendation 8: The Trust should review the tools and processes available to support
staff working with families who do not endorse clinical decisions and may be reluctant for
their relative to take medication. In particular concerns and information about side effects,
side effect monitoring and the documentation of those discussions.
Recommendation 9: The Trust should prioritise psychological therapy for high risk patients
likely to benefit from it.
Recommendation 10: The Trust should ensure all key stakeholders- including any victim of a
patient related serious incident – have an opportunity to review and comment on a draft
investigation report in advance of sign off.
Recommendation 11: The Trust should review its processes for engaging with third parties
affected by the actions of its patients, with a view to ensuring a comprehensive and
supportive communication pathway.
Recommendation 12: NHS England should review the national guidance in place to support
the victims of serious incidents and mental health homicides, to develop a strategy to ensurehealth and social care providers offer appropriate support and engagement as required, bothfor recovery purposes and assurance that improvements have been identified andimplemented.
Recommendation 13: The Trust must provide an evidence based review of its action plan to
the CCG with a view to it being signed off within three months.
Recommendation 14: The Trust should assure itself as a priority that it has the correct
systems and processes in place to monitor and implement action plans, and that it maintainsevidence audit trails of actions implementation
Recommendation 15: The CCG should review itself as a priority that it has the correct
systems and processes in place to gain timely assurance of the robustness of Trust
investigation reports and action plans.
Recommendation 16: The CCG should assure itself as a priority that it has the correct
systems and process in place to be assured Trusts are implementing action plans, and that
there are no other historical cases in which action plan assurance has not been sought and
provided, specifically for high risk and Board level cases.
Recommendation 17: The CCG should assure itself as a priority that Trusts respond to
commissioner concerns regarding investigation reports and action plans, and do not sign off
reports in advance of the CCG quality assurance process.
